Declassified US Embassy docs:- The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan Part II
Lt. Col Iskander Mirza, Secy of Defense Ministry, today asked Emb Army Attache pass following to me: Major General Akbar Khan "is 100 percent Communist" and has been in contact with Communists since he recently took up his job as Chief of Staff at Rawalpindi. In personal opinion Col Mirza, conspirators motivated by dissatisfaction with GOP handling of Kashmir issue and feeling that Pak should turn away from Western powers and toward Soviet Union. In addition to those whose arrest has been announced, Air Commodore Janjua, senior Pak airman recently returned from school in UK is under house arrest. Janjua is known to have been in contact with conspiring army officers. Two unnamed communists, presumably civilian, are being sought but have gone underground. Brigadier Hussain, Director Interservices Intelligence, expressed opinion to Army Attache that there is some unrest in Pak Army especially among junior officers and enlisted men, because of failure to settle Kashmir issue. Some members of Army strongly believe a change in Govt is only solution. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, March 10, 1951 
When I called upon Sec Def (Mirza) this date on the MDAP matter he volunteered the following information which he asked me to pass on to the American Ambassador: a. Major General Akhbar Khan, senior military man involved in the conspiracy, is 100% communist. When he came to Rawalpindi as Chief of General Staff he contacted the communists of the Punjab. b. In addition to the people mentioned in the paper as having been arrested, the senior Pakistani Air Officer, Air Commodore Jinjua, recently returned from UK is in "house arrest." He had conferred with the defecting army officers. c. In the opinion of Colonel Mirza, dissatisfaction with the handling of the Kashmir affair is probably behind this affair. He thinks that these officers wish to change their governments orientation from the West to Russia. d. He thinks that the Russian Embassy to Pakistan had something to do with the plot. He said that the Embassy had spent considerable money in the Punjab, to the extent of giving cameras to people. Secret Memorandum for the Record, March 10, 1951
Colonel Mirza, GOP Defense Secretary, stated to ConGen while visiting Lahore that Martial Law should be continued for a considerable period, in order that the politicians woudl understand that they had a duty of patriotism toward the country and could not act for their own selfish purposes. He did not indicate what period of time Martial Law would remain in force. He also stated that it was necessary that the civilian authorities did not revoke any of the Court Martial sentences. Without making a statement to that effect, he gave the impression that he was of the opinion that Daultana should be removed. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, March 12-18, 1953, March 19, 1953 [emphasis in original]
I am convinced that at the present time the Government of Pakistan is being influenced strongly by a group of civil servants who have the backing, if not the actual participation, of the Pakistan Army. As far as I can determine, the definite members of this clique are Iskander Mirza, Akhtar Husain, and Agha Hilaly. Inasmuch as it is almost impossible for anything to happen at the secretarial level without the knowledge of the Cabinet Secretary, Aziz Ahmad, and inasmuch as he attended the Cabinet meeting on the night of February 26 at which the decision was taken to act firmly in the religious agitation, it is more than probably that Aziz is a participant. More than likely his brother, Ghulam Ahmad, the Interior Secretary and Intelligence Chief, is also involved. ... I do not believe the group has influence or power enough yet to dictate political decisions to the Prime Minister. ... AS you will recall from my conversation with General Ayub, I was told by Ayub that while he was reluctant to enter politics, he would take "no nonsense from the Center." That, of course, was before the declaration of martial law in Lahore. Iskander Mirza subsequently told Col. Ashworth that as long as the Central Government proceeded in the right direction it would have Army support. He, too, implied that they would step in if there were signs of deviation from the present firm policy. Top Secret Office Memorandum of Karachi Embassy, April 6, 1953
Gen. Iskander Mirza leaves tonight midnight for Dacca to assume Governorship East Bengal tomorrow. ... Impossible predict reaction East Bengal; violence certainly may occur. Mirza emphasizes has no desire rule by military force alone recognizes necessity establish clean administration. At same time he may be ruthless toward Communists. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954
PriMin asked me to see him this morning. He said in view close relationships our two countries he was telling me in greatest confidence that decision had been taken impose Governor's rule East Pakistan. Governor would be Iskander Mirza who was summoned from London and who will leave for Dacca tomorrow. ... PriMin stated first act of Governor would be to arrest known communists. ... PriMin stated intensified activity would proceed two fronts, psychological and economic. GOP plan establish two new radio stations East Bengal, step up informational program to high degree. On economic front Governor would see that peopel received cheap necessities of life, namely food, cloth, kerosene, mustard oil and salt. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954
Iskander Mirza sworn in as Governor East Bengal 1800 hours. N.M. Khan Chief Secretary GOEB. Section 92-A (Governor's rule) effective 1800 hours. IG police states District Magistrates to be given free hand for arrest "subversives". Minister Sheikh Mujibir Rahman will be arrested immediately. Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, May 31, 1954
"The present Governor of East Bengal has for private and personal reasons expressed a desire to be relieved of his office. It has therefore been decided to replace him by Major General Iskander Mirza who will be sworn in today." Telgram from Karachi Embassy, June 1, 1954
Mirza said the only way for the US to stiffen Ali's spine was to tighten the windscrew of economic and military assistance, making such assistance clearly dependent upon assurances of sane govt in Karachi. Mirza strongly recommended this course of action to US and stated his belief that Ali would respond favorably. Secret Telegram from London Embassy, Oct. 4, 1954
Mirza says he refused urgent calls return Karachi from London to await Primin. Believes Sunday's action in best interests country, especially retaining Primin. Asked whether he expected trouble Mirza replied "We will make trouble," meaning guilty would be punished. Said much to be cleaned up; for example Primin now finally recognized Mirza right in asking punishment corrupt Bengalis. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 26, 1954
Major General Mirza has said that democracy ran riot during the last seven years. It was not democracy but the denial of democratic rights that was responsible for the harm that has been done to our dear country. Had democracy a fair play, the evils would have been corrected long ago. UF Statement on General Mirza, Nov. 19, 1954
Comment on future form of government in Pakistan, Dec. 24, 1954
According to the Gazette of Pakistan dated January 21, 1955, Major General Iskander Mirza, C.S.P., retired from Government Service with effect from October 24, 1954. In effect this post-dated action removes from General Mirza the onus of having been appointed to a Cabinet post while still a member of the Civil Service. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 25, 1955
Pakistani government will ignore challenge to its legality, Feb. 12, 1955
Iskander Mirza speaking February 15 to newly-organized West Pakistan Brotherhood praised Armed Forces highly and denied they taking active interest politics, and said "they have never taken part in politics nor is there any danyer that they will do so." Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 17, 1955
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, March 11, 1955
NSC Briefing: Background -- Estimated Balances in Pakistan Politics, June 12, 1956
Secret Letter from Ambassador Hildreth to John Foster Dulles, Sept. 20, 1956
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 18, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 19, 1953
It becomes clear that Nazimuddin dismissal was planned and accomplished through combined efforts of Army leadership (specifically Def Secy Iskander Mirza and C-in-C Gen Ayub) and Gov Gen himself. Frustration which EMB has reported over past few months grew to exasperation at weakness and vascillation of Nazimuddin. Without doubt action by Iskander Mirza to declare martial law in Lahore Mar 6 in spite of PRIMIN objections saved country from what might have become national disaster. Mirza has apparently been in close touch with Gov Gen. Decision was taken by Gov Gen himself that PRIMIN could not be successfully managed and dismissal was planned. EMB believes very few people in Govt were privy to this decision - perhaps no one except Mirza and Ayub. ... EMB believes unity now exists in country which has not prevailed since assassination Liaquat. Army is in firm position and will brook no nonsense. Whether Mohammad Ali will be able rise to demands of situation is not entirely certain and it is possible stronger leader such as Qayyum may take over at later date. EMB believes that in this favorable situation, US faces great opportunities develop closer relations with Pakistan and influence PAK policy toward settlement outstanding issues and toward firmer commitments to free world. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 20, 1953
Perhaps this is the true picture: the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed could never have dared to dismiss a Ministry which had appointed him, had he not have had the support of the Army. The Army would take its cue from the Defense Secretariat. Therefore this is in fact a coup d'etat by Mr. Iskander Mirza and the Army, which has nominated Mr. Mohammed Ali as its agent. The Army (which includes Mr. Iskander Mirza) would not have been encouraged to do this, if it was not certain that the new dispensation would have the support of the Americans, on whom today Pakistan is almost wholly dependent for its food requirements, and to carry on the ordinary expenses of the Administration. We can give this credit to the Army that it, like other common citizens, saw that the country was going to the dogs, that the prevailing regime had lost the confidence of the people, that it had not the capacity to remedy the existing state of affairs, and that at the same time it could not carry the people with it in any of its measures. The Army, too, may have started getting ideas after its contact with the people and the civil administration in Lahore. The Americans must have been in contact with the Army, and the coup d'etat must have had their blessings. The Americans must have found (i) That there was no point in butressing an unpopular Ministry. (ii) There there was no point in giving supplies to an incompetent Ministry which would dissipate those supplies. (iii) That there was no hope of getting appropriation from Congress unless it was satisfied that the Ministry in Pakistan had popular support and Army support. (iv) That an unpopular Ministry cannot succeed in inducing the people to accept its policy in international affairs, and hence such a Ministry is useless to the Americans if they want Pakistan to accept the international policy of America. That is to say an unpopular Ministry in Pakistan cannot deliver the goods and is therefore useless for the American global strategy. The change in the Administration is therefore a result of American plus Army maneuvers, born of the conviction, for which there is every justification, that Nazimuddin's regime was thoroughly unpopular and incompetent. Letter from H.S. Suhrawardy, April 21, 1953
Reversing their earlier critical attitude toward Nazimuddin, [the Awami League] are now shedding crocodile tears over his removal from the Prime Ministership, asserting that GHULAM MUHAMMED and his cronies from the Punjab had determined to eliminate Nazimuddin because he supported the provision in the BPC Report for "parity" between East Bengal and the rest of Pakistan in representation in the National Legislature. Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week Ending June 24, 1953, June 25, 1953
Constititional Coup of September 21, 1954
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 22, 1954
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 25, 1954
Pakistan Political Crisis, Sept. 25, 1954
Unsigned Top Secret Telegram #74, Sept. 25, 1954
Top Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 27, 1954
The "Constitutional Coup" in the Constituent Assembly, Oct. 2, 1954
Divestment of Governor General's Powers by Constituent Assembly, Oct. 3, 1954
Reftel and other recent Karachi messages seem clearly imply new group may well try seize control GOP within next few months. Motives and character Consembly rebellious element indicate new govt would be more to right than current clique with conservative "old Moslem leaguers" in dominant position but with little chance of communist or other leftist influence. Dept concedes good possibility such group might be less cooperative, less friendly to United States than present PriMin. Secret Telegram from John Foster Dulles, Oct. 6, 1954
While agree change Govt would not increase Communist leftist influence, situation East Bengal different from that West Pakistan. Commies stronger East Bengal would exploit instability which might result. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 7, 1954
The Department of Defense has reported that the Military Attache in Karachi has recently recommended the award of the Legion of Merit to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Mohammed AYUB Khan, stating that this recommendation is strongly supported by the Ambassador. Secret Telegram from Department of State, July 10, 1951
General Ayub stated that he had been talking to the leading politicians of Pakistan, and had told them that they must make up their mind to go whole-heartedly with the West. ... He stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand,and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking on a large responsibility, but that the Army's duty was to protect the country. Secret Telegram from Lahore Consulate, Dec. 23, 1952
The Commander-in-Chief stated that he felt that there was no danger, from either politicians or the public, to overthrow the present Government, but in case there was such an attempt the Pakistan Army would immediately declare martial law and take charge of the situation. If the situation was critical, the Army would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan. He stated the Pakistan Army would not allow either politicians or the public to ruin the country. Top Secret Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Feb. 13, 1953
He said that the army was not interested in going into politics but that he had no intention of letting things get out of control. He said the army was a stabilizing force in Pakistan and that he would take no nonsense from the politicians. ... I got the distinct impression from Ayub and from subsequent conversations with his senior officers who were in Lahore at the same time, that the Pakistan Army is definitely ready to take control should Civil Government break down, although they would be reluctant to do so. Memorandum of Conversation with General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Feb. 28, 1953
I took General Ayub for cocktails last evening and he is very much discouraged with our Number One guest who arrives in Washington this afternoon. He thinks there may be repercussions along the lines of your recent cables but expresses no alarm as far as the country as a whole is concerned. He is terribly confident of the ability of the Armed Services to step in any time as, if and when necessary. Secret Telegram from State Department, Oct. 14, 1954
NSC Briefing: Pakistan, Oct. 29, 1958
It will be noted that he was accused inter aliaof incitement of the masses to violate law and create disorder, violation of Secton 144, speaking so as to excite disaffection with the GOP, and disclosures of state affairs regarding weapons supply. Grounds for Detention of Bhutto, Dec. 4, 1968
MI officer told him that 24 officers arrested had been plotting to assassinate President Bhutto at Lahore People's festival (revival of old Lahore horse show) when he attended as chief guest on March 31. Report of Military Assassination Plot Against President Bhutto, April 2, 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1971
On February 7, I made a routine call on Rao Rashid, Deputy Director of Intelligence. ... It was tragic, mused Rao, to have a man at the helm who despite all the blunders he committed, refused to step aside to the end, even though the nation was being destroyed. Political Notes, Feb. 17, 1972
Level of political violence and shrillness of political rhetoric has been on increase recently. Apart from Sind language riots, there have been disorderly political incidents in Lahore, Rawalpindi and elsewhere. Heightened political atmosphere has coincided with Bhutto's greater involvement in grass-roots politics in wake Sind riots. While regime's miscalculations and oppostion irresponsibility have contributed to new atmosphere, it seems also to reflect degree of return to pre-1971 "politics as usual." Although disquieting, trend toward violence does not yet threaten Bhutto regime. Main present danger is that regime will be goaded into more repressive measures which could feed still more violence. Domestic Political Violence on Increase Aftermath Sind Disturbances, Aug. 4, 1972
Pakistan: Factionalism in Bhutto's Party, July 1, 1975
Jamaat-e-Islami, which translated literally means "Islamic Organization," is a Mullah-led, reactionary Islamic political party. Prior to partition the Jamaat, founded in 1941, was an inactive religious group without major interest in politics. However, since partition it has assumed an active part in politics and has gained strength, although it still plays a minor part in Pakistan politics. ... At the annual meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami held on November 10 through 13, party leaders displayed an interesting combination of reactionary religious ideology, communist line propaganda and ideas of the welfare state. The meeting was attended by delegates from all over Pakistan. ... Certainly not a powerful force in Pakistan politics today ... the party is significant as an example of reactionary Islam in Pakistan politics. Annual Meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, Nov. 28, 1951
The information contained in this report is from Ghulam Mohammed, Secty. Karachi Jamaat-i-Islami. He was anxious to get information on this organization into the hands of the American Embassy, he stated, because the organization "is misunderstood by foreign embassies and is the target of false propaganda from the Muslim League." Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Party) was established in pre-partitioned India in 1941. Its main object is "revival of Islam, in both letter and spirit. We believe Islam is a complete code of life. We believe in democracy, with some changes regarding the limits of legislation. We believe that the government should be run by the people, but that the representatives are duty-bound to fulfill the laws written in the H.Q. Confidential Embassy notes, author unknown, circa 1951
Thirteen members of the Jamaat-e-Islami have been taken into custody by the Martial Law Authorities in Lahore including Maulana Maudoodi, Mian Tufail Mohammadand Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi. Eighteen other Jamaat-e-Islami members were arrested outside the Lahore Martial Law area under the Provincial Public Safety Act. Comment: Maulana Maudoodi was one of the few prominent religious leaders who had escaped arrest during the general round-up of extremist Mullahs. He has now been arrested on the strength of a pamphlet which was just published in which Maudoodi tried to attack the Ahmadiyas by clever implications without indulging in open incitation. Martial Law authorities howwever felt that he had overstepped and thereupon arrested him. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, March 26-April 1, 1953, April 2, 1953
Maulana Maudoodi, leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, arrested Mar 28 during anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Lahore, found guilty of complicity in riots by military tribunal May 11, and sentenced to death. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 12, 1953
Following the protest meeting and strike on the 14th occasioned by the sentence of Maulana Maudoodi reported in the Consulate's despatch 96 dated May 14, 1953, an effort was made to organize a Maudoodi Day on May 22. Whereas the first demonstration was organized by Ulemas, the one scheduled for the 22nd was sparked by political opposition groups headed by the Awami League. Political, Press, and Economic Developments for the Week Ending May 27, 1953, May 28, 1953
Congen has no rpt no information to confirm GOI intelligence report that Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) groups planning attacks on Indian diplomats. Although prior to partition, JI supported Congress Party and opposed creation of Pakistan, JI has adopted anti-Indian position since partition. Its leaders, including recently retired Maulana Maudoodi, have advocated both moral and secular legality. Report of Planned Terrorist Attacks on Indian Diplomats, Nov. 7, 1972
The Embassy's confidential source stated that the organization was almost still-born, with no activities and few members. It is believed, however, that a recent conference of world Muslim divines held in Karachi may have given a fillip to the branch. In addition to Mahmoud Sawwaf there were several Middle Eastern Akhwan leaders at the conference. Hassan-ul-Hudeibi, the president of the Brotherhood did not come from Cairo but sent as his deputy Allama Mahmood-uz-Zubairi of Yemen. As-Syed Baha El-Amiri, the erstwhile Syrian Ambassador to Pakistan, fired from his job as a result of differences with Colonel Shishakly, was at the conference as Syrian delegate. Before his diplomatic appointment, El-Amiri was an officer in the Syrian Brotherhood. Another Akhwan leader, Sheikh Syed Ramazan of Egypt was also in attendence.
The World Muslim Conference (Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islam) in Karachi sponsored a meeting on February 23 in observance of "Hasan-el-Banna Day" which was presided over by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem and addressed by El-Amiri and Syed Ramazan; the latter was termed the son-in-law of Hasan-el-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Secretary of the World Muslim Conference in conversation with officers of the Embassy evinced little interest in the formation of the Brotherhood, it is possible that the Motamar will support the embryonic organization. Formation of Muslim Brotherhood Branch in Pakistan, Feb. 28, 1952
The Anti-Christian Riot at Matta, Aug. 28, 1951
Memorandum of Conversation with Rev. Frank Llewellen, Aug. 16, 1951
Of the 22 defendants, two were sentenced to death and 10 were sentenced to 19 years. The drafting officer has spoken to a few lawyers in Lahoer regarding these sentences. All were of the opinion that the two sentenced to death would have their sentence commuted to 15 years, and the others to 5-8 years by the reviewing court. The Christian missionaries with whom the drafting officer has spoken in regards to the trial all feel satisfied that justice was done - even if the sentences are commuted. Confidential Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Dec. 21, 1951
Anti-Communist Program in East Pakistan
PURPOSE: To destroy Communist influence and develop a positive (counter) program based on the new national ideals of Pakistan. ... Collaboration between the USIS and the Government of East Bengal is to be kept secret. To this end every attempt will be made to keep knowledge of the program confined to the three officers of the American Consulate and the three officers of the Government of East Bengal whose concerted effort is necesssary to the formulation of plans and policies.
OPERATIONAL THEMES: ... To link communism with imperialism by demonstrating that the original meaning of the word is being used as a cloak for planned conquest. ... To show the communists as anti-God and therefore a threat to the continued existence of the Muslim world as a free and independent religio-political entity. ... To promote the Islamic socio-economic concept under which there will be freedom and dignity for the individual and which will provide for the elimination of economic disparities and inequities. Coordinated Program for Combatting Communism in East Bengal, Aug. 7, 1951
Developments in Iran and Egypt are seriously affecting Pakistan popular position reference United States and we should now expect period of critical attitudes. This change may imperil parts of information program. Clearly any revelation of my private understanding with top GOP officials will create greatest embarrassment to them. ... View GOP changing position it is most imperative that all discussion be halted bringing GOEB personnel to Washington for discussion this highly delicate operation. If information officer GOEB is later sent to US as Leader Specialist, he should be given leader itinerary treatment and should not repeat not be consulted about policy matters affecting cooperation East Pakistan. We must assume he does not know of my overall understanding. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 5, 1951
Re Leader-Grant for either GOP or GOEB official, Department merely indicated availability of Grant in relation to request contained in Dacca Despatch 13; with assumption Embassy retaining actual perogative of nominating whomever desirable. If Embassy does desire send any official as straight leader-grantee, special project will not be discussed in Washington as you recommend. Secret Telegram from State Department, Nov. 16, 1951
Department will not invite GOEB official for purpose discussing subject your Despatch 13. However, ordinary leader-grant can at some future date be offered a Dacca journalist or even GOEB official, under normal Embassy selection processes. Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1951
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 23, 1952
Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, Feb. 28, 1952
Chief Minister Nurul Amin attended a meeting of the Mymensingh District Muslim League workers on June 14 and addressed the conference at some length. He reviewed the origins of, and government action during the Dacca riots in February, and announced that he had conclusive proof that these groups of people, viz. communists, other foreign agents, and political mal-contents had conspired to subvert the state from within. As for the communists, he quoted from a Calcutta communist paper which boasted of the party's assisting the Language Movement in the right direction. As to the foreign agents, he dramatically flourished a secret document which he said was a circular of February 12 of an organization with headquarters outside Pakistan calling upon its members in East Pakistan to exploit the Language Movement. The name of the organization he withheld in the public interest. As for the disgruntled politicians, he observed that they are well known, and their motive in mising into the Language Movement and the riots was to split East and West Pakistan (he did not refer to the United Bengalers as such, but he evidently had them in mind). Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, June 21, 1952
Confidential Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, Feb. 27, 1953
Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, May 6, 1954
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week Ended May 21, 1953, May 22, 1953
Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 26, 1954
Political Developments for the Two Weeks Ending December 16, 1953, Dec. 17, 1953
Meanwhile there remains somewhat uncomfortably in my mind real concern over the Governor General's attitude and approach to affairs these days. ... I certainly do not see how running around East Bengal smashing Commies has much relation to what happened to the League in that province. Of course I see where a good Commie campaign might help disrupt the UF -- but then what? Governor's Rule? Martial law? The League has some hard lessons to learn. I hope the price won't be too high or the instruction period too long. Secret Telegram from State Department, April 27, 1954
Agitation in East Bengal Schools and Colleges, Sept. 29, 1955
Political Attitudes and Opinions, East Pakistan, April 28, 1955
Gov. told me today will outlaw commie party East Bengal tomorrow. Said requested authorization from Center mid-June but only answer to date is under consideration. Thus, following abortive commie attempt few days ago blow up main bridge into Dacca he has decided to proceed [unilaterally]. Center as yet uninformed but will receive telegram from Gov. simultaneously with announcement of demarche. Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, July 6, 1954
Overt Activities by Communists and Other Former Security Prisoners, Nov. 16, 1955
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 29, 1953, May 1, 1953
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 21, 1953, April 22, 1953
The subject of U.S. military aid to Pakistan remained the dominant political theme during the week. On December 19, 1953, the Government of Pakistan presented a note to the Soviet Embassy in Karachi replying to the Soviet note of November 30 which demanded "clarification" of the press reported on the subject of "American military air bases" in Pakistan. ... The Indian National Congress party's drive to arouse public opinion in India against US military aid to Pakistan evoked a bitter reaction in Pakistan. Public opinion media referred to it as a "hate campaign" and held it to be particularly significant as it was government sponsored. Weekly Summary of Political Events for Week Ending December 24, 1953, Dec. 24, 1953
Weekly Summary of Political Developments for Week Ending December 19, 1953, Dec. 19, 1953
Summary of Political Developments for the Week Ending June 19, 1953, June 20, 1953
Weekly Summary, Political and Economic Events 29 October thru 4 November 1953, Nov. 5, 1953
Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Sept. 24 through Sept. 30, 1953, Oct. 1, 1953
Weekly Political and Economic Report, Jan. 25 - Feb. 1, 1953, Feb. 2, 1953
Political and Economic Developments for the Week August 10-16, 1952
Political and Economic Developments July 15-21, 1952, July 21, 1952
Political and Economic Developments July 8-14, 1952, July 14, 1952
Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending April 3, 1952, April 3, 1952
Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending, March 20, 1952, March 20, 1952
Anti-Ahmadiya Agitation in Lahore, March 10, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 28, 1953
Weekly Summary Dec 15-21, 1952, Dec. 22, 1952
Weekly Summary, Dec. 1-16, 1952, Dec. 8, 1952
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 16, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 18, 1953
The Islamic Constitution of Pakistan, Jan. 11, 1954
Memorandum of Conversation with Yusuf Haroon, April 3, 1954
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 19, 1955
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug. 12, 1955
Current Position of Communism in Pakistan, July 10, 1953
The Pakistan National Alliance: Participants and Prospects, circa Aug. 1977
Pakistan's Problems, Jan. 8, 1979
Suhrawardy Scores Victory Over Leftist Opponents in East Pakistan, June 16, 1957
Resignation of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Oct. 12, 1957
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works. For educational use only.
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